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Introduction
The main contribution of this note is to extend the literature on optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of externalities (e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala 1997 , Cremer et al. 1998 , Kopczuk 2003 , Micheletto 2008 ) to a multi-externality setting. One important result from this literature is that the 'additivity property', rst discovered by Sandmo (1975) , also holds in a more general model of the Mirleesian type. 1 The additivity property consists of two components. First, the presence of an externality only aects the tax rate on that particular good (which generates the externality).
Second, the internalizing part of taxation enters the tax formula additively. This result is quite remarkable and has important policy implications as it states that an externality is best addressed by taxing directly that particular good, while the rest of the tax system should remain unaected by the externality.
However, one important shortcoming of the previous literature is the assumption that there is only one externality-generating commodity. But in reality the consumption of many commodities causes externalities. Thus, the aim of this note is to generalize the optimal tax problem (income and commodity taxes) to a multi-externality framework and to clarify the optimal tax structure in such a context. I show that the 'additivity property' remains valid with respect to the income tax and also with respect to the taxes on the non-externality generating goods, as they still remain unaected by the externalities. However, I nd that in general a tax on an externality-generating commodity also depends on the externalities induced by the consumption of the other commodities, which violates the 'additivity property'. If the level of an externality increases (decreases) the demand for another externality-generating commodity this is an additional argument to increase (decrease) the tax rate on that commodity. Thus, such interdependences between the externalitygenerating commodities should be taken into account when designing optimal Pigouvian tax rates.
Applications where this interdependence of the externalities might be of particular relevance include alcohol and cigarette consumption or car and gasoline consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 presents the main results on the optimal tax structure. Finally, section 4 concludes. The derivations of the main results are provided in the Appendix.
The model
Consider an economy consisting of two types of individuals i = L, H, who dier in earning ability ω L < ω H . The size of the population is normalized to one and π i represents the fraction of individuals of type i. Individuals provide labor supply l i and earn gross income z i = ω i l i . As is common in the optimal taxation literature (e.g. Mirrlees, 1971 ) the tax administration can only observe gross income z i , while earning abilities and working time of an individual i are assumed to be private information. Gross income is subject to a nonlinear income tax, and consumers allocate their net income x i over n + m consumption goods. Commodities are produced by a linear technology with labor as the only input to production. Quantities are chosen such that all producer prices are equal to one.
Let the vector of the rst n commodities consumed by an individual i be denoted by c i = (c 1i , c 2i , ..., c ni ) and the vector of the other m commodities by
The consumption of each of the m commodities creates a negative externality, whereas the consumption of the rst n commodities does not. More precisely an externality is created by the total consumption of a commodity m, i.e. the level of an externality is given by
there are m dierent externalities in the model represented by the vector E = (E 1 , E 2 , ..., E m ). Individuals have identical preferences described by the strictly concave utility function u(c i , d i , l i , E) with rst partial derivative being positive with respect to c ji and d ki and negative with respect to l i and E k . I restrict the analysis to cases where ∂u/∂E k < 0 only for expositional reasons but allowing for positive externalities would not cause any complication. In addition, following previous work (e.g. Sandmo, 1975) , I assume that individuals behave atomistically, i.e. they do not take into consideration the inuence of their own consumption on the level of the externalities.
The individuals' maximization problem is analyzed in two steps. In a rst step, individuals allocate a xed amount of net income x i over the consumption goods. Let consumer prices be denoted by p j = 1 + τ j for the rst n commodities j = 1, ..., n and by q k = 1 + t k for the other m commodities k = 1, ..., m. Hence, the government can impose proportional commodity taxes τ j and t k , respectively, on each of the n + m commodities. It is well-known that in such a tax system one tax is redundant, thus without loss of generality τ 1 is set equal to zero, i.e. p 1 = 1. The rst stage of the maximization problem gives conditional indirect utility
2 Meade (1952) has termed this type 'atmospheric' externalities.
and conditional demand functions
Observe that in general the demand for all commodities depends on the level of the externalities
In a second step individuals choose their optimal labor supply by maximizing conditional indirect utility subject to the budget equation
function. This yields the well-known expression for the implicit marginal income tax rate
which is given by
The objective of the government is to design a tax system, consisting of a general income tax and proportional commodity taxes, which maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function given the informational structure of the model and an exogenous revenue requirement. The problem of nding the optimal income tax schedule can equivalently be stated by determining the optimal gross and net income bundles x i , z i for each type. Thus, the optimal income tax for the two types of individuals is determined implicitly as the dierence
Note that the available tax instruments are completely determined by the information structure of the model. Since earning abilities are not observable to the government (only the distribution of types is known), type specic rst-best lump-sum taxes are not feasible. Therefore the government has to use a general income tax as a second-best instrument. In addition, consumption is assumed to be observable only in the aggregate, while individual consumption levels are private information. Thus, type specic nonlinear commodity taxes are not feasible either.
The utilitarian social welfare function reads
where f L and f H , with f L ≥ f H ≥ 0, represent the weights of the two types of individuals including the fractions π L and π H . The agent monotonicity condition is assumed to hold,
This implies that for any income tax function the high-able individual does not choose to earn less income than the low-able.
The resource constraint is given by
i.e. tax revenues have to be raised to nance exogenous public spending g. In addition the government's choice of optimal taxes is restricted by a self-selection constraint, which reads
It assures that the allocation implemented by the government is such that the H type has no incentive to mimic or imitate the L type (by working less). The constraint that the L type does not mimic the H type can be neglected because it is not binding in the optimum, as the analysis is restricted to cases, where the government wants to redistribute from high-to low-ability persons.
To abbreviate notation indirect utility of the mimicker is denoted by v H [L] and consumption of the mimicker by c jH [L] and d kH [L] . In addition, the levels of the externalities are taken into consideration as separate (equality) constraints,
The Lagrange multipliers for the resource and the self-selection constraint are denoted by λ and µ, respectively, and for the constraints concerning the externality levels by γ k . The rst-order conditions for the maximization problem are provided in the Appendix.
3 Optimal tax structure
The optimal tax structure can be derived from the rst-order conditions of the social planner's maximization problem. Before I present the results for the optimal commodity and income tax rates, I discuss in more detail the shadow prices of the externalities measured in terms of tax revenues γ k /λ, k = 1, ..., m, as they will be highly relevant for the analysis of the optimal tax structure later on. This discussion is closely related to the one in Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) , which I generalize for the purposes of this study.
Let the marginal rate of substitution between E k and x i be dened by
It can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay of an individual i to reduce E k by one unit.
Note that M W P ki is positive as we assumed E k to be a negative externality. From the rst-order conditions one can then derive an expression for γ k /λ which is displayed in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 : In the social optimum the shadow prices of the externalities measured in terms of the government's tax revenues are given by 
Proof: The derivation of equation (10) is provided in the Appendix.
The shadow prices γ k /λ can be interpreted as the social harm or gain of a specic externality measured in terms of tax revenues. Lemma 1 states that in general the shadow prices depend on each other, i.e. the social harm or gain induced by the consumption of commodity k also depends on the shadow prices of the externalities induced by the consumption of the other commodities s (s = k), at least if E k aects compensated demand for these commodities. This can be seen from the last two terms on the RHS of (10).
Let me also briey discuss the other parts of the RHS of (10) ) captures the impact of the level of the externality on compensated demand for commodity k. If compensated demand for good k increases (decreases) with E k , this term is larger (smaller) than 1. Hence, the shadow price is larger if an increase in the level of the externality has a positive eect on the demand for the good which generates that externality. The rst-term within parenthesis is the marginal willingness to pay of all individuals to avoid the externality. It can be considered as the direct negative eect of the externality and as its sign is always positive, it increases the value of the shadow price. Then there is also an eect related to the self-selection constraint, represented by the second term within parenthesis. The sign of this eect is ambiguous.
It depends on whether the mimicker or the L type has a higher marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality. As the only dierence between them is labor supply provided the sign depends on ∂M W P ki /∂l i 0. Finally, the two terms in the second line of (10), describe the impact of the externality on government's tax revenues. The sign of these eects is again ambiguous, as the reaction of compensated demand due to a change of E k can have either sign. Altogether γ k /λ can be positive or negative, although E k is a negative externality. That is, an increase in the level of the externality could also generate a social gain. However, the case that an increase of the externality is socially harmful (γ k /λ > 0) appears more plausible because of the direct negative eect. Now I present the main results on the optimal tax structure. As the focus is on the Pigouvian role of commodity taxation, preferences are assumed to be weakly separable in labor supply and consumption. It is well-known from the literature that in the absence of externalities commodity taxation is not needed in the presence of a nonlinear income tax if preferences are weakly separable (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) . Hence, the potential role of commodity taxes in the model is exclusively to correct for the externalities. It can be shown that the essence of my results does not depend on the separability of the utility function. 3 In the Appendix I show that in the model optimal commodity tax rates have to satisfy
3 Of course optimal commodity tax rates look dierent if commodities are either complements or substitutes with leisure, as then they contain an additional eect on the self-selection constraint. However, the Pigouvian parts of taxation remain unaected by these eects.
where
The (implicit) solution to this system of equations is given by
It is unique if A is assumed to be non-singular. The optimal tax rates on commodities j = 2, ..., n remain unaected by the externalities, which conrms the validity of the 'additivity property' with respect to the tax rates τ j . Hence, given weak separability the optimal tax rates on these 'clean' commodities are zero. On the other hand the optimal tax rates on the externality-generating commodities contain a Pigouvian element which is positive if the externality is socially harmful (γ k /λ > 0). Looking at (14) one can see that for each k = 1, ..., m the optimal t k is equal to the shadow price of commodity k measured in terms of tax revenues. Thus, the rst impression is that the 'additivity property', stating that the presence of an externality only alters the tax rate on that particular good, is still valid. But from Lemma 1 we know that the marginal social damages of the m externalities depend on each other. Hence, when taxing commodity k one has to take into account the eects of E k on the demand for the other externality-generating commodities s(s = k)
and if these eects are nonzero the marginal social damages induced by the consumption of these commodities have an impact on the optimal t k . For example, if the demand for commodity s increases with E k this is an additional argument to increase t k (provided γ s /λ > 0), since reducing the level of the externality E k also reduces the consumption of commodity s, and hence E s . 4 Thus, if there is more than one commodity that generates an externality, the interdependence between these commodities should be taken into account.
Finally, I present the structure of the optimal income tax schedule. Combining (4) and the FOCs for x i , z i the optimal marginal income tax rates can be derived. They are given by
for the H type and by
for the L type. One observes immediately that the marginal income tax rates do not depend on the externalities, i.e. the additivity property remains valid with respect to the income tax as well.
Since the externalities do not aect the income tax schedule the optimal marginal income tax rates in our model are the same as those in the conventional mixed tax case when weak-separability is assumed. Thus, for a closer interpretation of these formulas the author refers to e.g. Edwards et al. (1994) . Proposition 1 summarizes the results we obtained on the optimal tax structure. ∂E k = 0 with s = k, the optimal tax rates t k on the externality-generating commodities depend on all shadow prices γ s /λ, s = 1, ..., m, i.e. on the marginal social harm or gain induced by each of the externality-generating commodities. This violates the 'additivity property' since the condition that an externality only aects the tax rate on that particular good no longer holds. The optimal tax rates on commodities j = 2, ..., n and the income tax are unaected by the externalities.
Conclusion
In this paper I study the optimal income and commodity tax structure in the presence of many externality-generating commodities, i.e. I drop the assumption made in previous contributions that there is only one externality-generating commodity. This allows me to study the interdependence between the externalities and to analyze possible implications for the optimal tax structure. I nd that the income tax and the taxes on the 'clean' commodities are unaected by the externalities, conrming previous results. On the other hand, the tax rates on the externality-generating commodities in general depend on the marginal social damage induced by the consumption of all commodities. Thus, I have shown that the optimal Pigouvian tax rates should not be considered in isolation separately for each externality, as the interdependence between them is important. This extension of the optimal tax design problem in the presence of externalities adds to further realism of the model, as in reality there are many goods whose consumption causes an externaliy. To get an idea about the magnitude of the elaborated eect more empirical evidence on the inuence of externality-levels (e.g. of an increase in pollution) on the demand for other externality-generating commodities is required.
Appendix
First order conditions of the government's maximization problem
The rst-order condition of the government's maximization problem with respect to the optimal income bundles (
Finally, the rst-order condition with respect to E k , k = 1, ..., m is given by
Proof of Lemma 1 Take A6 and add and substract µ 
